Niels K. Wagner
Niels K. Wagner
I am a 6th-year PhD student in the Finance Department
at the London School of Economics.
My research focuses on corporate finance and banking.
I am on the 2026-27 job market. CV
Email: niels[at]nielswagner.com
Rechargeable Collateral and Bank Lock-in (job market paper) with Angela Maddaloni
Collateral law can let firms commit to exclusive bank relationships. In many euro area countries, a firm and its bank can secure new loans under the bank's existing claim on real estate, up to the claim's registered amount and ahead of later liens. We call this right recharge. In a model with symmetric information, the threat of subordinating outside lenders gives the incumbent a markup on follow-up financing. Banks subsidise the initial loan with the expected markup, which lowers default. Consistent with the subsidy, loans secured by real estate new to the bank are 14 basis points cheaper than those secured by real estate it already holds a claim on. The discount does not appear in countries without recharge. After procurement awards, which would erode the incumbent's information advantage, firms locked in by recharge pay 21 basis points more than firms with the same excess collateral in countries without recharge. Firms in recharge countries, especially small ones, are twice as likely to pledge real estate and have 63% higher tangibility. By assigning exclusivity over future seniority, property law shapes how firms borrow and invest.
Competition authorities increasingly narrow credit markets by borrowers' characteristics, on the premise that small firms may need lenders with specific expertise. Yet narrowing the market definition makes data sparse, which mechanically inflates the standard measures of specialization and concentration. We measure a branch's specialization by the percentile of its portfolio share under random matching, a counterfactual without specialization, so that sparsity is not mistaken for specialization. In French credit data, branches specialize well beyond random matching in every market definition. Branch closures, which move borrowers to another branch of the same bank, show that a more specialized branch shifts credit away from the firms that later default and towards those that do not. We conclude that specialized lenders gain informational advantages through better screening in narrowly defined markets.
Electric vehicle mandates propagate to the car financing market through manufacturers’ vertically integrated lenders. In a staggered triple differences design, loan terms worsened for vehicle models that were excluded from qualifying for the sales quota, while financing for the most substitutable models with conventional combustion vehicles improved. These effects are heterogeneous across manufacturers depending on their distance to the non-compliance threshold. Manufacturers that sell fewer qualifying vehicles improve credit terms more than over-complying manufacturers. These adjustments highlight a causal driver of the financing wedge between electric and combustion vehicles that is unrelated to the riskiness of the borrower and collateral.
Awards: LSE Class Teacher Award 2023-2024 & 2025-2026, LSESU Outstanding Teacher of the Year Nomination 2024-2025
Courses:
FM101: Finance (2023-2026, latest teaching evaluation)
FM212: Principles of Finance (2022-2023)
Executive Education: Sustainable Finance and Impact Investing (2023-2025)